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Abstract
Repression and International Conflict
Calla Marie Buzy Hummel, M.A.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2014
Supervisor: Raúl Madrid
Scholars suspect that violence at home is linked to violence abroad but few
studies theorize or test any relationship between them. Under what conditions
does repression lead to international conflict? I extend the logic of why leaders re-
press to suggest that repression can alter states’ power internationally. I argue that
leaders can repress to prepare for a possible international conflict, but the act of
repressing alters their international bargaining power through a signaling mecha-
nism. The argument implies that governments continue to use repression because
it can increase their power vis-a-vis both domestic and international opponents.
With a global dataset on torture, death, disappearance, arbitrary arrests and in-
ternational conflict, I find that - even after controlling for regime type, civil war,
and military capabilities - states that repress are more likely to initiate conflict
the following year than states that respect basic human rights. Simultaneously,





2 What Do We Know about Repression and Conflict? 4
2.1 International conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Repression as a Costly Signal 10
3.1 Initiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 Conflict in the risk-return tradeoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4 Research Design 17
4.1 Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 Dependent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3 Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.5 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5 Results and Discussion 25
5.1 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6 Vignettes 30
6.1 Iraq: Executions as signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
vi
6.2 Eritrea: Disappearances and border disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31





1 Project Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Logistic regressions of repression on MID initiation, 1976-2004 . . . 26
3 Logistic regressions of repression on MID targets, 1976-2004 . . . . . 27
4 Logistic regressions of repression on MID involvement, 1976-2004 . 28
viii
Repression and International Conflict
1 Introduction
During the 20th century, states killed over 170 million of their own citizens,
several times the 38 million combined battle deaths from interstate and civil war
(Rummel, 1998). Scholars have long suspected that violence at home is linked
to violence abroad (Carr, 2001; Herbst, 1990; Rummel, 1998; Tilly, 1992), and
repressive, belligerent regimes like Iran and North Korea certainly suggest a con-
nection between repression and international conflict. Despite these suspicions,
few studies suggest or test any relationship between them. On the other hand,
numerous studies find that leaders repress to retain power in the face of domestic
dissent (Davenport, 2007a; Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003; Earl, 2011; Lichbach,
1987; Moore, 1998; Ritter, 2013). Does repression affect international power? Un-
der what conditions does repression lead to international conflict? I extend the
logic of why leaders repress to suggest that repression can alter states’ power
internationally.
I argue that repression signals a state’s willingness to use force while si-
multaneously revealing that the state is preparing for conflict. Leaders can repress
to prepare for a possible international conflict, but the act of repressing alters their
international bargaining power through a signaling mechanism. Where the signal
is clear and credible, potential adversaries become much less interested in at-
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tacking the repressor. However, after brutally containing dissent, the repressor is
more prepared for conflict than before and may threaten or attack other countries.
Those familiar with bargaining theories will recognize the signaling mechanism
and process from general models of conflict (Fearon, 1997; Filson & Werner, 2002;
Powell, 2006; Slantchev, 2005). I suggest that on the ground, repression is a com-
mon strategy that works through the models’ mechanisms.
These arguments imply that governments continue to use repression be-
cause it can increase their power vis-a-vis both domestic and international op-
ponents. This could partially explain why the dramatic increase in international
agreements condemning and punishing repression have decreased abuses only at
the margins (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Simmons, 2009; Vreeland, 2008a). In order to
deter repression, these agreements would need to address or prevent the military
benefit that governments seek through repression.
In the following section, I discuss what causes international conflict and
repression as well as the theoretical links between them. In the third section, I de-
velop the signaling function and international effects of domestic repression and
describe how these can lead to conflict through a risk-return tradeoff. I derive
testable hypotheses from this discussion, specifically, that repression decreases
the likelihood of being a target in an international conflict while increasing the
likelihood of initiating one. I contrast these hypotheses against the possibility
that repression attracts intervention or opportunistic attacks, which would falsify
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the theory. In the fourth section, I evaluate these hypotheses with logistic re-
gressions on a multiply imputed global dataset on torture, death, disappearance,
arbitrary arrests and international conflict. I find that - even after controlling
for regime type, civil war, and military capabilities - states that repress are more
likely to engage in conflict the following year than states that respect basic human
rights. Simultaneously, engaging in extreme repression virtually guarantees that
no state will target the repressor. I illustrate the theory and results with conflict
vignettes in the fifth section. I conclude with implications for the logic that drives
repression, efforts to reduce human rights violations, and future research.
3
2 What Do We Know about Repression and Conflict?
2.1 International conflict
In international relations scholarship, bargaining theories of war have sub-
sumed most other explanations for international conflict by explaining more stages
of conflict and demonstrating that past explanations were logically incomplete
(Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999; Wagner, 2010). Insofar as war is inefficient, the bar-
gaining framework offers an increasingly detailed and unified explanation for
conflict deterrence, initiation, duration, expansion, intervention and resolution
(Filson & Werner, 2002; Powell, 2006; Slantchev, 2005; Werner & Yuen, 2005; Wol-
ford, Reiter, & Carrubba, 2011). The basic bargaining model demonstrates that
conflict is inefficient for states compared to peaceful deals âĂŞ both sides benefit
more from reaching a deal without military conflict - but uncertainty along with
incentives to misrepresent and commitment problems can still lead to conflict
(Fearon, 1995).
An information problem is where one side has private information that
could change the other side’s behavior and there are incentives not to reveal that
information (Fearon, 1995). This happens in crisis bargaining, where each side
wants the other to believe that their intelligence, generals’ strategies, and resolve
are superior (Powell, 2004). Sides can engage in diplomatic or other talks, which
can be informative but can also lead to bluffing (Kydd, 2005; Sartori, 2002; Trager,
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2010). One way actors resolve this problem is by sending a costly signal, which
means doing something they might not do if they were bluffing, like making
public threats or mobilizing troops (Fearon, 1995, 1997; Lake & Powell, 1999). A
commitment problem occurs where one side has incentives to defect later on an
agreement that it would like to commit to today (Powell, 2006). Commitment
problems lead to conflict when an actor faces an adversary it would rather fight
now than accommodate later.
States try to establish key information like the other side’s willingness
to use force, costs, and military power through bargaining and then reach an
agreement that reflects the distribution of power (Filson & Werner, 2002; Wagner,
2000; Werner & Yuen, 2005). Imperfect information can lead to conflict through a
risk-return tradeoff where, without knowing what deals an adversary will accept
or reject, an actor makes an offer that runs some risk of conflict (Leventoglu &
Tarar, 2008; Powell, 2006). Actors do this because offering a deal any adversary
would accept keeps peace but concedes too much.
Fearon (1995), Powell (1999) and Filson and Werner’s (2002) basic bar-
gaining models have two unitary actors. Other scholars have relaxed the unitary
actor assumption to look at competing groups within a state and found that in-
dividuals or groups within the state may benefit more from conflict than from
a peaceful deal (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Powell, 2006; Putnam, 1988; Snyder,
1991). Some scholars use this finding to argue that leaders may start international
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conflicts to divert their constituents’ attention from domestic problems (Davies,
2002; Gelpi, 1997; Oakes, 2006). While a few isolated cases could be interpreted
as diversionary, scholars have found no statistical support and many have ques-
tioned the logic of diversionary theories (Chiozza & Goemans, 2003, 2004, 2011;
Dassel & Reinhardt, 1999; K. S. Gleditsch, Salehyan, & Schultz, 2008).
In a well-constructed study of diversionary hypotheses, Enterline and
Gleditsch (2000) model repression and international conflict as two possible choices
for leaders facing domestic instability and find that repression increases with do-
mestic threats but that repression and international conflict are two independent
choices. This finding is an alternative explanation and effectively a null hypoth-
esis for the present study: an increase in repression does not increase the likeli-
hood of international conflict. While Enterline and Gleditsch look at repression
and international conflict as two simultaneous choices, I suggest that repression
is temporally and in some cases causally prior to international conflict. Addition-
ally, I suggest that the decision to repress, like the decision to initiate a conflict,
does not exist in an international vacuum.
2.2 Repression
The concept of repression encompasses a wide range of actions, and all gov-
ernments engage in repression to some degree (Davenport, 2007a; Earl, 2011).
For this project, I use the Political Terror Scale’s restricted definition: extrajudi-
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cial killing, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment by state agents
(Wood & Gibney, 2010, p. 369). States strategically use tactics such as standard
arrests, confiscation, and the targeted denial of basic rights, goods and services
to intimidate and control and many scholars count these activities as repression
(Davenport, 2007a; Earl, 2003, 2011; Oliver, 2008). In this study, I do not include
these forms because there is no reliable global data on them and because the
theory rests on the similarities between violent repression and military force in
international conflict.
Term Definition
International conflict. A disagreement between countries where at least one
country takes a militarized action, such as threatening
to use force or sending troops to a disputed border.
Repression Extrajudicial killing, torture, disappearances and political
imprisonment by state agents (Wood & Gibney, 2010, p.
369)
Signal An action designed to reveal information to another ac-
tor.
Initiator The first state(s) to take a militarized action in a disagree-
ment between at least two countries.
Target The recipient(s) of an initial military action in a disagree-
ment between two or more countries.
Uncertainty/Information
problem
Where an actor has private information that could change
another actor’s behavior and there are incentives not to
reveal that information (Fearon, 1995)
Willingness/Resolve to
use force
A state’s commitment to use violence to settle disagree-
ments, after accounting for material capability.
Table 1: Project Definitions
Government repression has an endogenous relationship with dissent: when
authorities perceive dissent as threatening, they repress, which often leads to
more or different types of protest and then more punishment (Davenport, Soule,
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& Armstrong, 2011; Davenport, 2007b; Earl et al., 2003; Earl, 2011; Lichbach, 1987;
Moore, 1998; Ritter, 2013). Governments can end protest with massive repression,
if they have the means (Tilly & Goldstone, 2001, pp. 190-191). Thus, repression
is an effective form of social control in many situations but it is costly in terms of
legitimacy, risk of backfire, and security forces’ salaries. Institutions like elections
and autonomous courts increase authorities’ costs of repression, but contrary to
popular belief (Poe & Tate, 1994; Rummel, 1998), all governments repress to some
degree and only some democratic institutions reduce repression (Davenport &
Armstrong, 2004; Davenport, 2007b; Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004).
Theories of repression offer alternative explanations that link repression
and international conflict. First, many studies suggest that war causes simulta-
neous or future repression (Davenport, 2007b; Kalyvas, 2006; Lyall, 2009; Poe &
Tate, 1994; Rummel, 1998). I partially address this explanation in the empirical
model by evaluating repression that is temporally prior to conflict and accounting
for time since past conflict. I do not dispute that war causes some simultaneous
repression, particularly when war suspends institutions that check repression and
when heightened nationalism involves minority scapegoating (Davenport, 2007b;
Kalyvas, 2003). I supplement this relationship by suggesting that in many cases,
repression is an important cause of international conflict.
Second, many studies theorize repression as a signal of domestic instabil-
ity or weakness (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Goodwin, 2001; Vreeland, 2008a; Young,
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2013). Bargaining theories imply that international and domestic opponents will
try to extract concessions from a weakening regime (Ritter, 2013). Additionally,
governments frequently and publicly condemn other states’ repression, threaten
repressive states, and in extreme cases like genocide have signed treaties that re-
quire intervention to stop it (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Simmons, 2009). Following this
line of reasoning, we should expect an increase in repression to increase the like-
lihood that the repressor is a target in international conflict. If repression signals
regime weakness and attracts international adversaries, then repression cannot
also be a signal of resolve. I assess both hypotheses with the empirical model;
support for the repression as weakness hypothesis would falsify the theory.
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3 Repression as a Costly Signal
States have choices about how and to what extent they control dissent and
lethal repression is an exceedingly expensive option. It requires that states invest
in their security forces, privilege security goals and personnel over others, and
lose legitimacy. Moderate or slow increases in repression tend to spark more
dissent; only massive, brutal repression quashes it (Tilly & Goldstone, 2001, pp.
190-191). This level of repression demands considerable resources and political
power, and in many cases dramatically alters domestic politics and civil society
for decades; it is not an easy or expedient option (Green, 1994; Scheper-Hughes &
Bourgois, 2004; Taussig, 2004; Tilly & Goldstone, 2001). I posit that the immediate
and enduring domestic consequences of unleashing massive repression make it a
costly and credible signal that a regime is resolved to use force against threats. I
argue that the action is realized domestically but can signal resolve to use force
internationally. Extreme repression works as a signal first by simply exercising
force: if a state uses force against its own citizens, it may be more willing than
less repressive states to use force to counter international threats.
Second, by restricting dissent and mobilizing some unit of the security ap-
paratus, extreme repression can reveal that a state is preparing for international
conflict. Like military mobilization more generally, this demonstrates that the
state is increasing investments in security, developing people and things that it
can use in conflicts and removing potential obstacles. Dissent before and during
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conflict can present a variety of problems for governments, both by increasing
the domestic political costs of engagement and by publicly airing problems that
an international adversary can seize on at the bargaining table. Quashing dis-
sent and sowing fear through extreme repression curtails this, and studies have
documented many governments imprisoning, murdering, and otherwise silenc-
ing real and perceived dissidents before and during conflict for what appears to
be this reason (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011; Connell, 2005; Davenport, 2007b). For
example, the U.S. government arrested, sentenced, and executed Industrial Work-
ers of the World members before and during the First World War, blunting the
organization’s ability to orchestrate general strikes. Similarly, in crisis bargain-
ing, a state may want to demonstrate that it is not bluffing by revealing military
mobilization. However, it may not want to reveal key aspects of mobilization -
new weapons, intelligence activities, and planned troop movements - that lose
strategic value when revealed. I posit that lethal repression, like amassing troops
at the border, reveals that a state has competent intelligence networks, forces, and
planning without revealing strategic secrets.
3.1 Initiation
Fearon (1997) sets out two ideal-type signals: sunk costs, where an actor
spends resources purely to show that it is serious, and hand-tying, where an
actor establishes a punishment for backing down while raising the probability
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of success if it does not. Repression, like military mobilization generally, is a
hybrid signal: the state spends resources today to demonstrate its resolve to use
force in the future, but by mobilizing forces, it invests in its security apparatus
which then raises the likelihood of victory. A higher probability of victory makes
conflict relatively more attractive to the repressor than before (Slantchev, 2005).
Additionally, more resolved states are more likely to threaten (Trager, 2010). Thus,
we should observe that:
H1: An increase in repression increases the likelihood of initiating an
international conflict.
Repression is an extremely costly strategy that has deep and lasting do-
mestic consequences. Once a government has repressed, it is hard to undo the
effects (Davenport, 2007b; Green, 1994; Lambert & Nickson, 1997). Once on this
path, we should expect governments to threaten international adversaries more
often, even as signaling through repression successfully deters many adversaries
from attacking the repressor.
3.2 Targets
If repression works as a costly and credible signal of resolve, it should deter
international adversaries. The signal works to deter in two ways: first, by re-
vealing important information about the repressor’s willingness to use force and
preparations for conflict, the adversary has more information about the state it
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faces and can therefore make offers in routine diplomatic talks or crisis bargain-
ing that the repressor is more likely to accept, averting or ending conflict. Second,
as previously discussed, repression is a hybrid signal: the state spends resources
now to demonstrate its resolve but those resources are an investment in its secu-
rity apparatus, which raises the repressor’s likelihood of victory. That increase
makes the repressor relatively more interested in conflict, but it also makes ad-
versaries relatively less interested in attacking a now more formidable opponent
(Slantchev, 2005). Thus, if repression works as a hybrid signal, we should observe
that:
H2: An increase in repression decreases the likelihood of being a target
in an international conflict.
A costly signal that demonstrates resolve while increasing a state’s likeli-
hood of victory cannot, by definition, sabotage a state’s ability to fight. Thus, if
this theory is correct, extreme repression cannot signal that the regime is excep-
tionally weak or distracted, that it is diverting resources from external defense, or
that its security forces are devoted to repressing citizens and cannot fight foreign
soldiers. Many theories suggest that repression is a sign of a weakening regime
too beset by domestic problems to attend to much else (Fearon & Laitin, 2003;
Goodwin, 2001; Vreeland, 2008a; Young, 2013). These expectations would imply
that:
H3: An increase in repression leads to an increase in the likelihood of
being a target in international conflict.
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There are certainly normative reasons for this expectation: repression is
abhorrent and it would be easier to eradicate if it conferred no benefit to the
perpetrators. Unfortunately, it seems more plausible that we observe repression
in so many places because it brings some benefit to some perpetrators at some
level. Repression scholars have found that repression can strengthen a regime’s
hold on domestic power and I build on this finding to hypothesize that it also
strengthens a regime’s international bargaining position. Evidence to the contrary
– like support for hypothesis 3 – would falsify the theory. Support for hypothesis
3 would specifically refute the proposed signaling mechanism because an action
cannot decrease a state’s ability to fight and be a credible signal of resolve. 1
3.3 Conflict in the risk-return tradeoff
States face a risk-return tradeoff if they are bargaining over agreements, ter-
ritory, or other important issues, do not have key pieces of information, and if
conflict is an option. If both states had all relevant information and no commit-
ment problem, they could peacefully reach an agreement because each would
know the point at which the other is indifferent between conflict and peace. In a
risk-return tradeoff (Fearon, 1995; Leventoglu & Tarar, 2008; Powell, 1999, 2004,
2006), a state can make an offer that any adversary would accept, but it then con-
1If an action decreases a state’s ability to fight, it decreases its probability of victory, which
makes that state less interested in fighting and makes its adversary more interested in attacking.
There is no reason to use such an action as a signal – in fact, there is every reason to conceal it –
and states have other possible costly and credible signals to use if they are truly resolved.
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cedes more than it must to keep the peace. Instead, the state may make an offer
that a weak adversary will accept but stronger adversaries will reject in favor of
fighting. The stronger the adversary, the more likely it is to reject an offer as too
low. Adversaries can the make a counteroffer or escalate, starting or deepening a
militarized conflict. Counteroffers and fighting then reveal information about the
adversary. Thus, if repression strengthens the repressor’s bargaining position, it
could simultaneously result in better offers from other states and more conflict,
as the repressor becomes more likely to reject low offers in favor of escalation.
For example, Iraq demanded $10 billion from Kuwait on the eve of the first Gulf
War. Kuwait offered $9 billion, which Iraq rejected by immediately launching an
invasion.
The risk-return tradeoff suggests that not every increase in repression
should lead to conflict. If the theory is correct, strong signals often deter ad-
versaries. In other cases, the theory expects that an adversary makes an accom-
modating offer that the repressor accepts, averting conflict. In those cases, we
would observe repression but no international conflict. Governments may also
repress to consolidate domestic power with little concern for international conse-
quences and we would also observe repression but no conflict.2 In other instances,
an offer may not be high enough and the repressor may escalate into conflict. In
2Note that in these cases, the theory suggests that repression still sends a credible signal to
other countries and the act of repressing still invests in security forces and increases a state’s
chance of victory in future conflicts âĂŞ but there is no looming conflict to leverage that in. In the
sample, these cases should underestimate the effect of repression on initiation.
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those cases, we observe repression and international conflict. Thus, in looking at
the empirical record, no single case of repression followed by conflict or peace
roundly proves or disproves the theory. Instead, the trends in a collection of cases
can provide evidence for or against it.
In sum, the theory suggests that increasing repression improves a state’s
international bargaining position and a regime’s ability to stay in power. The
signaling effect implies that states use repression because it deters opponents in-
ternationally and domestically, but bargaining can still lead to conflict through a
risk-return tradeoff. Past studies have shown that repression often does consol-
idate state power domestically and contain dissent, but that the effect is uneven
(Davenport, 2007a; Earl, 2011; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998; Tilly, 1978). When
scholars look at the effect of domestic repression on international outcomes, they
largely focus on human rights agreements. This study adds that domestic re-
pression could affect international security politics as well. In fact, domestic state
violence may have a larger impact on international security than on international
law. States may use repression in spite of domestic uncertainty, international
norms and legal sanctions because it could deter attacks from other states. Thus,
this increase in power comes at a high cost to the country as a whole and the
international community because it increases both internal and external violence.
In the following section, I will evaluate these hypotheses with an empirical model.
16
4 Research Design
I combined data from Correlates of War (COW) and the Political Terror Scale
(PTS) for the main models and measures from Polity IV, the International Cri-
sis Behavior (ICB) project, the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data
project, Joseph Young’s job insecurity dataset, and the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram (UCDP) for controls and robustness checks (Bremer, Palmer, & Ghosn, 2004;
N. P. Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002; Marshall &
Jaggers, 2002; Sarkees & Wayman, 2010; Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972; Stin-
nett, Tir, Diehl, Schafer, & Gochman, 2002; Young, 2008). The resulting dataset
takes country-year observations as the unit of analysis. I use Militarized Interna-
tional Disputes (MIDs) to construct the main dependent variables, the PTS index
as the main independent variable, and adjusted XPolity scores, COW civil wars,
COW geographic contiguity, and the COW composite index of national capability
(CINC), which includes population and national production components, as the
controls. The dependent variables are binary – did a country enter, initiate or
become a target of a crisis in a given year – and I therefore use a logistic (from
here, logit) regression to estimate the independent variables’ influence.
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4.1 Sample
I use country-year observations3 from nearly every country in existence be-
tween 1976 and 2004 Ideally, the sample would cover all modern states over all
years that a given state has existed, but I am limited by data availability. Ac-
tivists began collecting reliable repression data on a global scale in the 1970s and
XPolity data stops at 2004. Likewise, the sample does not include all states be-
cause Polity does not code states with less than 500,000 citizens; I dropped those
33 micro-states from the dataset.4
There is considerable missing data in the original dataset: 54% of the
observations do not have information for at least one variable. This presents a
problem, because regression requires complete observations. The default solu-
tion to missingness is list-wise deletion, which excludes every observation with
missing information. Instead, I used a multiple imputation technique that builds
a multivariate normal distribution of all of the relevant variables and then fills in
missing data with simulated draws from the distribution (Yuan, 2011). This gen-
erates a number of datasets – in this case 40, in line with Graham et al.’s (2007, p.
212) guidelines – and calculates the standard errors using the variance within and
between the imputed datasets (Rubin, 1987). The multiple imputation approach
to missing data generates considerably less biased estimates than list-wise dele-
3For country-years in which multiple crises occurred, creating multiple entries for MIDs and
ICB data, I kept the crisis that reached the highest hostility level.
4These states tended to have sparse or no data from other sources as well. I also dropped
country-year observations for years in which a country did not exist or existed under a different
name (and used entries under that other name).
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tion and facilitates appropriate comparison between models by maintaining the
sample size across analyses (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 2001; Little, 2002).
4.2 Dependent variables
I use the MID dataset to construct three dependent variables. The dataset
is one of the main datasets in the international conflict literature and it tracks
military crises that escalated to war as well as the many more conflicts that states
settle short of war. For this study, I recoded MID variables into three binary
variables: crisis, initiation, and target. For the crisis variable, the countries that
did not enter a crisis in a given year received a 0 for that year while countries
that did received a 1. For the initiation variable, a country that initiated a crisis
in a given year received a 1 and all others received a 0; for the target variable, a
country that was the target of a crisis in a given year received a 1 while all others
received a 0.
To address the autocorrelation between yearly observations for the same
country, I created peace years, peace years squared, and peace years cubed vari-
ables for each country and included them as regressors. This procedure inserts
a third order Taylor series approximation to the hazard into the logit (Carter &
Signorino, 2010). Carter and Signorino (2010) introduced this simple method as
an efficient and equivalent alternative to more complicated approaches for ana-
lyzing time in cross sectional data with limited dependent variables, like splines
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and fixed effects (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 1998; Wilson & Butler, 2007). This cubic
polynomial approach outperforms fixed effects and performs in line with splines.
Unlike splines, it is nonparametric and does not require the researcher to specify
or assume big changes at any point in time. The cubic polynomial approach is the
most appropriate and efficient option for this dataset because the autocorrelation
plots differ significantly across countries.
4.3 Independent variables
I use the PTS index to construct the main independent variable. PTS defines
state terror as violations of physical or personal integrity rights carried out by
a state or its agents, such as extrajudicial killing, torture, disappearances and
political imprisonment (Wood & Gibney, 2010, p. 369). PTS averages Amnesty
International and U.S. State Department data to place countries on a 1 to 5 scale.
One means that a country respects personal integrity rights: rule of law exists,
people are not imprisoned for their beliefs, and torture and political murder is
virtually nonexistent. A score of 5 means that all citizens risk imprisonment,
torture or death by state agents (Wood & Gibney, 2010, p. 373).5 Most regimes
that we reflexively consider repressive (Iran, Syria, North Korea) score a 4 or 5
in a given year while most we consider free (Switzerland, Costa Rica) score a 1
or 2. Three includes transitional countries, great powers, and autocrats that rely
5Confusingly, the CIRI scale goes in the opposite direction.
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on fear from past repression, like Brazil, the U.S., and Russia. Thus, the main
independent variable is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5.
I lag the repression index one year. As stipulated by the hypotheses,
a short lag is the most theoretically appropriate: if repression works as a signal,
states should opt to use it before and during crisis bargaining. A monthly lag may
be more theoretically appropriate, but repression indexes are annual and a year
lag controls for conflict causing simultaneous repression. To check the one year
lag, I examined autocorrelation plots for several of the most belligerent countries
and several of the least. The plots indicated that autocorrelation decreased over
time but did not point to an ideal lag for all countries. I ran the main model
with one through five year lags and selected the one year lag because it had the
lowest AIC score and the significance of the lag and fit of the model decrease
markedly for lags of two or more years. Thus, a one year lag is both theoretically
and empirically appropriate for this model.
For the first control variable, I recoded the COW civil war data6 into a
binary variable indicating if a country was in a civil war (1) or not (0) in a given
year. This control addresses the robust finding that repression increases dramati-
cally during civil war and ensures that the findings are not driven by an increase
6I use the COW civil war data instead of the UCDP data because the 25 deaths threshold
in the UCDP data means that many events often regarded as repressive âĂŞ such as marches
that government forces open fire on âĂŞ are recorded as civil conflict. For example, the protests
following the Iranian elections in 2009 are coded as a civil conflict. Thus, there is too much
overlap between the UCDP data and this study’s concept and measure of repression. Even with
that caveat, the repression remains significant in models with the UCDP measure as a control, but
the magnitude of the effect is low.
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in all state violence (Daxecker, 2011; Findley, 2013; K. S. Gleditsch et al., 2008;
Kalyvas, 2003; Young, 2013). Additionally, I use CINC scores to control for ob-
servable capabilities. This addresses the concern that an increase in capabilities
could simultaneously increase a state’s capacity to repress its citizens and engage
in conflict. CINC includes population and three measures of production highly
associated with conflict and using CINC instead of population and GNP did not
significantly affect the estimates of any of the other independent variables. To
ensure that repression is not simply an alternative way to measure autocracy, I
use adjusted Polity scores to control for regime. As Vreeland (2008b) established,
some Polity criteria use instability, civil war and repression in coding, thus, I use
XPolity scores, which remove that criteria. Finally, I use measures of leader job
insecurity developed by Joseph Young (2008) to control for the increasingly com-
mon finding that a leader’s security drives high-level conflict decisions (Chiozza
& Goemans, 2011; Ritter, 2013; Wolford, 2007). I include these measures in robust-
ness checks but not the main models because the data end in 2001, the measure
was rarely significant, and including it barely moved the other variables.
4.4 Model
I use a logit to estimate the effects of repression and the control variables
on whether a country engages in a crisis in a given year or not. With a binary
outcome like crisis outbreak or initiation, a logit model is the most appropriate.
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Additionally, a logit is flexible enough to take categorical and continuous inde-
pendent variables. Furthermore, the coefficients can be easily transformed into
odds ratios for intuitive interpretation. The number reported as an odds ratio
indicates that for every unit increase in the independent variable, the dependent
variable is that many times as likely to occur. For example, an odds ratio of 3.3
means that a dependent variable is 3.3 times or 330% as likely with every increase
in the independent variable. Any number below 1 signifies that the likelihood
decreases with every unit increase in the independent variable. For example, an
odds ratio of .9 means that with every unit increase, the likelihood of the depen-
dent variable decreases by 10%. In other words, an odds ratio below 1 means the
same thing as a negative sign for a standard coefficient.
4.5 Summary statistics
In the 28 year sample, there are 166 distinct countries and 4482 unique
country-year observations. Countries engage in a MID in 1365 of the country-
years; in other words, 30% of the observations include a MID. Of those 1365, 1212
of them initiated the conflict and 154 are targets (countries join together in formal
and temporary alliances to attack targets, leading to lopsided initiation numbers).
This makes for a sample where 27% of the observations are of a MID initiator and
but only 3% are targets. Simultaneously, 447 observations or 10% were during a
civil war. Most countries during most years generally respected human rights:
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2488 or 55% of the sample scored less than a 3 on the PTS scale. However, 1119 or
25% scored between 3 and 4 and 672 or 15% scored 4 or more, signaling extreme
repression (202 observations had missing repression data and were imputed for
the analysis). Governments with a lagged score of 4 or higher started 299 con-
flicts – 25% of all conflicts in the sample. In summary, the sample includes a large
number of MIDs and a small number of years of extreme repression, after which
a disproportional number of MIDs occurred.
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5 Results and Discussion
Repression has a significant effect on whether a country engages in inter-
national conflict the following year or not. At every point in the PTS index, a
one point increase in repression had a significant effect on crisis participation.
Material capability and number of borders were consistently significant as well.
Regime type was not significant in any model specification; this is not surpris-
ing given that Davenport and Armstrong (2004) find that democracy decreases
repression at only the highest levels and that I use monadic data while the demo-
cratic peace finding is dyadic (Leeds, 1999; Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith,
1999). Civil war had a positive influence but was not significant in all models.
Many scholars argue that repression can lead to civil war and that extensive re-
pression occurs during civil war (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Goodwin, 2001; Kalyvas,
2006; Young, 2013); thus, civil war variables could be picking up effects that are
actually driven by repression or repression and civil war measures could overlap.
Table ?? presents estimates on MID initiation from a sparse model, a
model with the empirically and theoretically strongest controls, and with full
controls. The table shows that for every additional point on the repression scale,
a country becomes 20% more likely to initiate a conflict the following year than a
country that does not increase repression. Over the 28 years analyzed, 29 coun-
tries scored a 5 and then initiated a conflict in the following year, often more
than once, for a total of 83 conflicts initiated after extreme repression. This result
25




Repression 1.2*** 1.23*** 1.18***
(.04) (.04) (.04)









Carter & Signorino time adjustment coefficients suppressed.
Standard errors in parentheses below odds ratios. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001
Table 2: Logistic regressions of repression on MID initiation, 1976-2004
When we look at the targeting results in Table ??, we see a statistically
and substantively strong effect in the opposite direction, supporting hypothesis
2. Repression significantly decreases a country’s chance of becoming a target in
an international conflict, lending support to hypothesis 2 over hypothesis 3. The
odds ratio of .48 means that a country that increases repression by one point on
the PTS scale is 62% less likely than a country that does not to be targeted in a
conflict the following year. The summary statistics paint an even starker picture:
over the 28 years analyzed, states targeted only one country that scored a 5 for ex-
treme repression the year before: Uganda in 1977. During the same period, there
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were 153 other conflicts with less repressive targets. In contrast to popular belief
and hypothesis 3, extreme repression does not appear to lead to intervention7 or
opportunistic targeting. In fact, an increase in repression drastically reduces the
likelihood that other countries will target the repressor.
Models
1 2 3
Repression .53*** .51*** .48***
(.04) (.04) (.05)









Carter & Signorino time adjustment coefficients suppressed.
Standard errors in parentheses below odds ratios. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001
Table 3: Logistic regressions of repression on MID targets, 1976-2004
Instead of washing out, Table ?? shows that the increase in initiation and
decrease in targeting combine to produce a net increase in international conflict
participation. Specifically, increasing repression is associated with a 10% jump in
the chance that a country will participate in a conflict the following year, although
the increase is not statistically significant at the .05 level in all models.8 This find-
7Note that the dataset addresses state intervention, not international organization intervention.
For example, the MID dataset includes state interventions authorized by the UN Security Council
but not UN peacekeeping missions.
8The p value for repression in Model 3 is .09.
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ing is worrying because it implies that increasing violence domestically not only
makes regimes more secure, it also makes them more belligerent internationally.
Models
1 2 3
Repression 1.08** 1.1** 1.06
(.03) (.03) (.03)









Carter & Signorino time adjustment coefficients suppressed.
Standard errors in parentheses below odds ratios. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001
Table 4: Logistic regressions of repression on MID involvement, 1976-2004
To summarize, the analyses suggest that the previous year’s repression
score has a substantive and statistically significant relationship with international
conflict the next year. Regime type does not have a significant effect on this behav-
ior. States that increase repression now are more likely to engage in international
conflict next year, and they are especially more likely to initiate international con-
flict. At the same time, states that repress today are much less likely to become
targets in international conflicts tomorrow. A quick look at key cases confirms
this pattern: North Korea initiated conflicts nearly every year between 1976 and
2004 but was a target of none, and Eritrea, probably the most repressive country
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without nuclear capabilities, has initiated over 20 crises since independence in
1993 and was targeted once by Ethiopia.
5.1 Robustness
The models presented here are the main models with the most theoretically
appropriate lags and errors. I ran these models adding control variables in one
at a time, with and without errors clustered by country – on unimputed data;
the imputed data uses Rubin’s (1987) error formula – and with different lags
and time controls. The results are robust to different model specifications; the
significance and magnitude barely change as controls are added or subtracted.
Additionally, the results are generally robust to alternative measures of each of the
variables, including the CIRI index, the UCDP civil conflict data, four measures
of job insecurity, ICB crises, and change in repression score.9 The results from
the original dataset with significant missing data were also similar to the results
presented here.
9Out of several dozen models run with alternative measures, repression was insignificant in one
model with an ICB dependent variable and one measure of change in repression score. Robustness
checks are in the .do file. The model that used ICB crises as the dependent variable was sensitive
to specification – for example, using a different constellation of controls or a CIRI score instead
of a PTS score generated significant results. The models that used change were insignificant, but
the results became larger than those presented here and highly significant when I disaggregated
change and looked at increases to a 4 or 5. This is additional support for the theory, which would
expect only large and externally obvious increases in repression to generate a clear signal.
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6 Vignettes
6.1 Iraq: Executions as signals
Iraq used publicized and half-concealed repression as it prepared to invade
Iran and then Kuwait. Before and during the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used highly-
publicized arrests and executions to prevent civilians and soldiers from express-
ing dissent. In 1980, three months before invading Iran, the regime trumpeted
the execution of the country’s top Shi’a cleric, Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr and his
sister (Aziz, 1993). During the war, the regime publicly executed the families of
Kurdish activists and fighter pilots who had missed targets (Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, n.d.).
Prior to invading Kuwait, the regime opted for targeted political execu-
tions. In one widely-reported case, Iraqi authorities arrested Farzad Bazoft, an
Iranian-born journalist working for a British newspaper. The British government
attempted to intercede; interviews in 2003 revealed that the Iraqis knew he was
not a spy (Vulliamy, 2003). Secret recordings of Iraqi foreign relations discussions
released in 2009 reveal that Saddam Hussein ordered him executed as soon as
possible as a signal to the British ("Meeting between Saddam and Senior Iraqi
Officials discussing the execution of British Journalist Farzad Bazoft," n.d., p. 2).
In the recording, Saddam says to several ministers,
"I say we execute him in Ramadan, and this will be the punishment
for Margaret Thatcher... Are they underestimating us? After all the
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damages we’ve suffered and sacrifices that we have made over the last
eight years, the British still do not know us well!"
Bazoft was executed in March 1990, five months before the invasion of Kuwait
(Gordon, 2011).
6.2 Eritrea: Disappearances and border disputes
Eritrea became independent from Ethiopia in 1993 and has since become
one of the most repressive and belligerent countries in the world (Connell, 2005,
2011). In 1993, Eritrea emerged from years of rebellion against Ethiopia as an
unusually cohesive and optimistic country (Connell, 1993, 1995; Kidane Mengis-
teab. & Yohannes, 2005). However, in 1998, Eritrea invaded Ethiopia, launching
an extremely destructive war that ended in 2000.
As Eritrea rebuilt in 2001, high-ranking generals and bureaucrats began
to ask for the implementation of the 1997 constitution (Kidane Mengisteab &
Yohannes, 2005). For several months and supported by a nascent press, citizens
experienced political debate (Connell, 2005). Then in late 2001 and 2002, Isaias
Afwerki’s government arrested or disappeared all critical military officers, minis-
ters, and students, and all of the country’s journalists (Connell, 2011). In the next
wave, it arrested parents and community elders that protested the arrests or tried
to mediate. Over ten years later, none of the critics have been released and many
have died in prison (ibid).
Eritrea did not start any international conflicts in 2000 or 2001. After the
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crackdown in 2001, the regime maintained an extremely repressive atmosphere:
universal national service came to mean open-ended conscription for all men
over 18 and under 40 and women without children, and summary execution for
dissent or desertion are common (Connell, 2011). Since 2002, Eritrea has initiated
border conflicts with its neighbors every year (Gettleman, 2007). Out of over
20 military conflicts with larger powers since independence, Eritrea initiated all
but one, a small border clash with similarly repressive Ethiopia in 2012 (Smith
& Johannesburg, 2012).10 Repression and broad conscription has enabled the
country of 6 million to repeatedly take on its larger - up to 20 times more populous
- and richer neighbors (Gettleman, 2008).
6.3 Repressive targets: Civil wars and spillover
Exceedingly few repressive countries have been targets of international con-
flict. The few in this category were either in civil war, experienced spillover from
a neighbor’s civil war, or were targeted by a similarly repressive government.
For example, in 1977, Uganda – the only country in the sample to score a 5
and become an international target the following year – was one of six targets in
a dispute initiated by three other repressive regimes, Cuba, Angola, and Zaire.
The dispute involved Zaire’s regime and rebels reportedly backed by Angola and
Cuba and a series of coalition- and counter-coalition-building moves that exter-
10This conflict is not listed in the previous section’s summary statistics because it is outside of
the sample’s date range.
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nalized Zaire’s civil conflicts by sending small numbers of troops and militias
clashing across shared borders ("Other African Nations See a Test of National
Integrity in Zaire," n.d.).
Similarly, the MID dataset lists Angola, Chad and Burundi as targets in a
1998 dispute. These countries had PTS scores of 4 previous year and were roiled
by their own civil wars. Furthermore, the initiators, the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, each had the highest possible PTS score, 5, the pre-
vious year. The conflict involved troops, militias, and cross-border rebel groups
clashing along extensive shared and poorly-controlled borders as the countries
jockeyed for influence in the DRC and with each other ("Zimbabwe Troops Might
Help Congo Fight Rebels," 1998).
For the most part, these repressive targets are exceptions that prove the
rule. Countries in civil wars are significantly more likely than others to be in-
volved in international conflicts. Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz (2008) demon-
strate that many of these conflicts come from unintentional spillover as rebels and
refugees cross poorly-marked borders and soldiers pursue them; in these cases,
crisis bargaining is largely absent and signaling mechanisms are not at work. On
the other hand, when repressive countries face other repressive countries, the the-
ory predicts that both countries’ domestic violence provides credible information
about resolve, reducing the likelihood of conflict. The extremely low number of
repressive targets supports the argument that repression is a strong and credible
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signal. Furthermore, the relative increases in the probability of victory from se-
curity force mobilization should cancel out if the countries are equally repressive
or favor the more repressive country if they are not. This prediction is supported
by the 1998 case, where the two most repressive countries initiated a dispute with
slightly less repressive neighbors.
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7 Conclusion
The results and the theory paint a pessimistic picture. They suggest that
we continue to observe so much state terror because it is an effective strategy:
it contains dissent domestically while making leaders more secure vis-a-vis their
foreign counterparts. States that increase repression seem to successfully deter
attacks from other countries while increasing conflict internationally by initiating
disputes more frequently than other states. I argue that this is because repres-
sion works as a credible and costly signal of a regime’s resolve to use force. By
deploying organized violence against its own citizens, repression reveals that a
government is willing to use force to settle disputes and that it is preparing for
conflict by quashing dissent and investing in its security apparatus. This signal
makes the repressor’s threats more credible than less repressive states. However,
by investing in security forces and controlling dissent, the very act of repressing
increases a state’s likelihood of victory in a conflict, simultaneously making it
more interested in threatening others and other states less interested in engaging
with it.
If other states could perfectly observe each other, they would simply strike
more favorable agreements as relative power shifted and we would observe no
conflicts. However, states rarely have all of the relevant information and uncer-
tainty leads states to make offers that engage a risk-return tradeoff, where with-
out knowing exactly what an adversary will accept or reject, a state makes an
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offer that runs some risk of conflict. If repression works through the theorized
signaling mechanism, then repressors can receive better offers on average from
adversaries but, because of the increased power, still reject more often in favor of
escalation.
This study has implications for human rights agreements and suggests di-
rections for future repression research. First, to understand and ultimately reduce
repression, we must pay attention to its international effects. Leaders may use vi-
olence at one level to signal or secure power at another level. If so, naming and
shaming tactics and human rights agreements without enforcement provisions
have little effect because they do not reduce the large international security ben-
efits that leaders receive for deploying violence domestically. These agreements
need enforcement mechanisms that counter the security benefits of repression. In-
ternational Criminal Court ratification addresses this by countering the domestic
political security that leaders can get from repression, but because it does so di-
rectly, the worst offenders do not ratify it (Chapman & Chaudoin, 2013). Human
rights clauses have been added to trade agreements with some success (Hafner-
Burton, 2005); adding them to alliance, anti-terrorism or other security agreements
could replace the security benefits of repression with a preferable strategy.
Second, future research should explore human rights agreements that di-
rectly address leaders’ security in office and enforcement mechanisms that counter
the international security benefits of repression. Additionally, this study raises
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questions that could be answered with finer grained data. For example, in this
theory, leaders can only improve their international bargaining position through
repression if other states observe it. While some repression is intentionally very
public, human rights observers note that governments keep some repression care-
fully hidden. Why and when do states want domestic and international audi-
ences to know about violent acts or not? Does hidden repression undermine
security when it is revealed? If so, why does some repression increase regime
security while some decreases it? Likewise, future research should disaggregate
repression into specific practices, including nonlethal forms of repression, to as-
sess which practices have the most pronounced effects on citizens, leaders, and
opposing states. Finally, future research can only assess these questions by devis-
ing creative ways to collect data that go beyond country-year databases and case
studies. Large and coarse global datasets have revealed important trends, but we
need finer-grained and more extensive qualitative or quantitative data to improve




(1998). Zimbabwe troops might help congo fight rebels. The New York Times.
Aminzade, R. (2001). Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Aziz, T. M. (1993). The role of muhammad baqir al-sadr in shii political activism
in iraq from 1958 to 1980. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 25(2):207–
222.
Beck, N., Katz, J. N., and Tucker, R. (1998). Taking time seriously: Time-series-
cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of
Political Science, 42(4):1260–1288.
Bremer, S., Palmer, G., and Ghosn, F. (2004). The MID3 data set, 1993âĂŞ2001:
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